A New Model for the Liar

Autori

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.13130/2037-4445/7958

Abstract

A new model for the language of arithmetic enhanced by the unary truth predicate T is presented, which extends Kripke’s minimal fixed point. The latter, it will be argued, does not adequately model the truth predicate, since no difference between Liars and Truth-tellers can be made. The new model, which contains an extension of Kripke’s in- terpretation of T along with a new 4-valued logic, overcomes this inadequacy. The gist of my proposal is that 'paradoxical' ought to be treated as a truth value: Liar sentences, unlike Truth-teller sentences, do not simply lack a truth value. They do posses one: they are paradoxical. 

Biografia autore

  • Luca Castaldo, Leibniz University Hannover
    Since 2016: PhD candidate at Leibniz University Hannover. - 2014-2015: MSc in Science, Technology, and Society at University College London. - 2011-2014: BA in Philosophy at University of Milan.

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Pubblicato

2016-12-24

Fascicolo

V. 7 N. 2 (2016)

Sezione

Articoli

Licenza

Gli autori mantengono i diritti di proprietà intellettuale per il proprio lavoro, mentre la rivista entra in possesso del diritto di esclusività riguardo la prima pubblicazione. La rivista si riserva la possibilità di creare un archivio Open Access sotto Licenza Creative Commons. Gli articoli sono pubblicato con una licenza Creative Commons By Attribution.

Come citare

A New Model for the Liar. (2016). Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior, 7(2), 17-44. https://doi.org/10.13130/2037-4445/7958